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and Economic Advancement’ project led by the Institute of Development Studies and funded 
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This case study was designed to investigate how people in poor communities 
in Brazil are taking action to improve their local economies and how 
participation is important to achieve that. In a context of economic 
marginalisation and limited access to infrastructure and public goods, local 
movements have risen in which residents organise themselves to discuss major 
community issues and try to find a solution together. The experience of Banco 
Palmas, the first Brazilian Community Development Bank (CDB), inspired 
the spread of this model across the country and resulted in the creation of 
the Brazilian Network of Community Banks (BNCB). By definition, CDBs are 
grass-root initiatives developed and managed by the community, working for 
the community, based on solidarity economy principles. The purpose of the 
BNCB is to exchange experiences, advocate for solidarity economy, articulate 
policies and partnerships, and to support the creation of new CDBs. Building 
from the experience of Banco Palmas, this study endeavours to understand 
the role of participation as a fundamental component of CDBs, and how it 
has been encouraged and promoted by the BNCB. The findings are based 
on a series of interviews with CDB representatives, the BNCB, the Brazilian 
government and other experts working in this area, as well as a comparison 
of the experiences of three CDBs: Banco Estrutural, Banco Mumbuca and 
Banco Palmas itself to understand the relevance of community engagement 
and ownership over the banks, as well as the significance of external partners 
for their survival. While the BNCB has become a national reference for 
establishing new CDBs based on participation, other factors including the 
origins of the CDBs, the effectiveness of their communication, their ability to 
reach beyond an activist base and their financial sustainability strategy are key 
to CDBs enabling participation.
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Y 1 Introduction
Following one of its meetings to discuss community problems and 
potential solutions, the residents’ association of Conjunto Palmeiras, a poor 
neighbourhood on the outskirts of Fortaleza, Brazil, decided to establish a 
microcredit bank. The bank would lend money to producers and consumers 
in a local currency, in order to encourage wealth circulation in the area. The 
concept was an outcome of a survey conducted in the neighbourhood, which 
revealed that most of the residents’ earnings were being spent outside the 
community, and could be used to enhance the local economy if purchases were 
made locally. The initiative, better described below, flourished and it inspired 
a model known as the Community Development Bank (CDB) to emerge 
around the country. Subsequently, the Brazilian Network of Community Banks 
(BNCB) was established.
Under the subject of ‘Participation in Economic Advancement’, this case 
study explores a grass-roots movement of people working on solutions for 
local poverty. Based on BNCB’s experience, this research investigates how the 
BNCB enables economic activity that better serves community goals, and how 
lessons from this experience inform understanding of meaningful participation 
in economic advancement. It asks: 
  How do community banks in Brazil seek to influence or shape the local 
economy/economic processes that affect citizens? What is the role of 
citizens in setting and achieving these priorities?
  How have local economies changed since the community banks were set 
up? What contribution have the banks made to these changes, and what 
other factors have affected them?
  What role does the BNCB play in supporting or enabling community 
banks in these processes? What are the key mechanisms, tools and 
processes?
  What are the main constraints or challenges to participation in economic 
advancement, and have these been addressed? If so, how?
The key concepts used in this case study are participation, solidarity economy 
and economic advancement. According to the Brazil Ministry of the Economy, 
in the solidarity economy workers are collectively organised and are at the 
same time the businesses’ owners. They make decisions on how to manage 
the business, distribute functions and share the results, relying on principles 
of cooperation, self-management, economic action and solidarity (ME 2015). 
Ecosol Public Hearing, 
2010. 
Photo credit: © Lumo 
Coletivo, CC BY 2.0.
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societal goals, improving socioeconomic conditions of a given community. 
Lastly, participation refers to ‘organised efforts to increase control over 
resources and regulative institutions in given social situations, on the part 
of groups and movements hitherto excluded from such control’ (Stiefel and 
Wolfe 1994: 5).
In order to address the research questions, the case study is organised in five 
sections, including the current introduction (Section 1). Section 2 describes 
how Banco Palmas, the first Brazilian CDB, was created and how its 
prominent model inspired other community banks to emerge, resulting in 
the launch of the BNCB. Section 3 explores the importance of community 
engagement in the creation of a CDB, exemplifying how different levels of 
participation influence community banks’ sustainability (or survival). It compares 
the cases of Banco Palmas, Banco Estrutural and Banco Mumbuca in order to 
understand that influence. Understanding mechanisms of participation are a 
key part of Section 3. Section 4 is a review of the impact of CDBs in the life 
of the communities in which they operate. Section 5 concludes the work by 
identifying key success factors and some challenges faced by the BNCB and 
relevant lessons for the future. 
2 Banco Palmas and the origins of 
the BNCB
Banco Palmas, the first CDB, was established in 1998 by ASMOCONP, the 
Residents’ Association of Conjunto Palmeiras, a poor community in the 
outskirts of the city of Fortaleza in northeastern Brazil. However, its history 
of community mobilisation goes back long before. In the 1970s, Conjunto 
Palmeiras was a fishing community favourably located near Fortaleza’s 
downtown and commercial area. However, real estate pressure, urbanisation 
and a tourism project prompted the local government to move the poor 
community away from the coastal line and send its inhabitants to a swampy 
area 22km from the city. The dictatorship that had ruled since 1964 offered no 
opportunity for dissent. The residents then built their new dwellings without 
government support, meaning that besides living distant from schools, jobs 
and public services, they had to deal with the absence of infrastructure – 
water, sanitation, electricity (Jayo, Pozzebon and Diniz 2008).
In 1981, local leaders supported by national and local organisations founded 
ASMOCONP – a space for discussion of problems and solutions. During 
this time, the country was still under dictatorship (1964–85) and social 
movements and activism were dangerous enterprises. Only with the country’s 
re-democratisation could ASMOCONP finally raise its voice and demand 
infrastructure and social improvements from the government. Water and 
electricity were the first achievements in the late 1980s, but sanitation and 
asphalt only came in the 1990s (Mathie et al. 2017). Despite government 
interventions in infrastructure, poor socioeconomic conditions persisted. In 
an attempt to understand the causes of poverty in the community, in 1997 
ASMOCONP conducted an informal consultation in the neighbourhood, 
which pointed to high unemployment rates and precarious work conditions as 
widespread issues. Moreover, it found that 90 per cent of the families lived on 
less than two minimum wages per month (R$240.00, or US$218.88 /month). 
Most (75 per cent) of the adults were illiterate and 1,200 children within 
school age were not in school. Additionally, many residents were leaving 
their houses because they could not afford to pay the bills that came with 
urbanisation, such as water, electricity and property taxes (Jayo et al. 2008).
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Another census was conducted to map community spending and residents’ 
consumption. Young people were mobilised to carry out an extensive 
residential (door-to-door) survey (Jayo et al. 2008). The result was surprising. 
The mapping revealed that families together spent an average of R$1.2m a 
month (US$1m in 1998) on general shopping, but most of it (80 per cent of 
expenditures) was made outside the community. That meant that many of 
the resources that could have been used to support the local economy were 
flowing out of the community, mostly to commercial centres in Fortaleza. 
In addition, local entrepreneurs were excluded from traditional credit lines 
offered by commercial (and even public) banks due to the burdens inherent 
in complying with formal requirements, rendering it very difficult to set 
up their businesses. Whilst the low level of local purchasing (only 20 per 
cent) was discouraging, the lack of resources and credit lines also inhibited 
new local businesses from emerging. Conclusively, the fact was that the 
32,000 residents of Conjunto Palmeiras were not completely poor, but the 
community itself became poor due to the external spending that undermined 
the local economy (França Filho, Silva Júnior and Rigo 2012).
Relying on the results of the consultations, ASMOCONP began a series of 
discussions with residents, community leaders, merchants and producers to 
find solutions to address the issue. They sought to encourage families to keep 
their spending inside the community whilst finding a way of stimulating the 
local market, generating business opportunities and creating income and jobs. 
After 96 meetings and roundtables, they agreed to establish a community 
bank to provide credit to both consumers and local entrepreneurs (França 
Filho et al. 2012). In January 1998, Banco Palmas was inaugurated. 
Different from conventional microcredit organisations based on market-
oriented principles and profit goals, Banco Palmas was founded on the basis 
of the solidarity economy. Its ultimate goal was community development, 
as the bank itself was an expression of the residents’ needs and interests. 
It represented a community’s self-organisation towards economic 
empowerment based on ‘principles of solidarity, trust and mutual help’ (França 
Filho et al. 2012: 503). Whilst conventional microcredit lines complied with 
formalities and criteria that excluded most of the poor, particularly the very 
poor, CDBs trusted social relations as a guarantor for loans.
To address the issue of keeping wealth circulating locally, Banco Palmas 
created the Palmacard – a community credit card accepted only in the local 
market. When it first opened its doors, the bank started with R$2,000 
(US$1,800) borrowed from a local NGO named Cearah Periferia. Various 
outreach efforts were then made to raise funds. In six months, R$30,000.00 
(US$27,000) was raised from other national and international NGOs 
Front view of Banco 
Palmas. 
Photo credit: © Wikimedia 
Commons/Pmorizio, 
CC BY-SA 3.0.
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(Jayo et al. 2008). Local authorities (city and state) were consulted, but no 
support was offered. The idea of community banks was still rare in Brazil, 
particularly in the Northeast. The R$2,000 initial capital was paid off in eight 
months. It was all used on the inaugural day, providing a total of R$500 
in credit for consumption distributed through 20 Palmacards. The other 
R$1,500 was split among five producers and local merchants. Donations from 
international cooperation agencies kept Banco Palmas’ activities alive. In 2005, 
Banco Palmas signed an agreement with the Popular Bank of Brazil (Banco 
Popular do Brasil – BPB, of the public Bank of Brazil), which initially provided 
credit of R$50,000. This amount rose to $1.5m by 2009, negotiated at a 1 per 
cent interest rate. Further in 2010, Banco Palmas’s finance achieved R$10m 
(US$5.8m) in annual transactions, offering credit lines at a 1–3 per cent interest 
per month compared to the average 5.26 per cent offered by commercial and 
public banks in the same year (Fundação Procon-SP 2010). In August 2010, 
Banco Palmas received a loan from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) 
of approximately R$1.7m. Since then Banco Palmas has lent in excess of R$14m 
to more than 5,500 small businesses, 85.5 per cent of which were led by 
women1 (Instituto Palmas 2019). The interest rate charged by Banco Palmas 
depends on the interest charged by its credit providers, but is always set at the 
lowest possible level (Instituto Palmas 2010). Furthermore, Banco Palmas and 
all the community banks that follow the model have a different approach to 
defining interest rates. The higher the loan the higher the interest rate, up to 
the limit of 3 per cent. This logic is based on prioritising principles of solidarity 
and sustainability as opposed to efficiency, which is used in most microcredit 
programmes. For instance, since the cost of delivering a loan of US$100 is 
approximately the same as lending US$1,000, but the latter has a higher 
potential revenue, most microcredit programmes apply a lower rate of interest 
for higher amounts. In the opposite direction, community banks charge higher 
interest rates from businesses requesting higher amounts, given their stronger 
capacity and economic means to afford those rates.
The Palmacard gained popularity, with an increasing number of local 
enterprises adhering to this payment method (despite some initial scepticism). 
However, there were some limitations. For instance, merchants and producers 
had to wait a month to exchange Palmacards for reais, the official Brazilian 
currency. Although entrepreneurs using the Palmacard increased their sales, it 
was not a very effective tool for small businesses that needed to purchase their 
supplies elsewhere outside Conjunto Palmeiras. In the pursuit of dynamism, 
1  Data up to August 2018.
P$1,00: Banco Palmas. 
Photo credit: © Lumo 
Coletivo, CC BY 2.0.
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to enhance economic activity and improve the circulation of wealth, Banco 
Palmas introduced the Palmas currency in 2002. The Palmas currency was 
indexed 1:1 to the real, and could be easily exchanged at any time in the bank. 
By 2010, 240 local businesses were registered with Banco Palmas to exchange 
Palmas to reais.2 Most businesses frequently offered 5–10 per cent discounts on 
purchases made in Palmas (Instituto Palmas 2010). On the other hand, there 
are currently three ways in which residents (consumers) have access to Palmas: 
borrowing from Banco Palmas; receiving their salary through the bank; or 
directly exchanging reais for Palmas in the bank (Instituto Palmas 2010).
2.1 Origins of the BNCB
Banco Palmas’ approach, based on community agency for economic 
advancement, caught the attention of universities, governmental authorities 
and NGOs. Invitations to present its experiences at conferences and seminars 
across the country became routine. Similar initiatives then emerged, inspired 
by Banco Palmas’s methodology. In 2004, when a number of CDBs were 
already established, the first national conference of community banks was held 
with the support of the recently created National Secretariat of the Solidarity 
Economy, situated in the Ministry of Work and Employment (SENAES/MTE). 
SENAES was created by the newly elected left-wing government of Lula 
da Silva, which had a track record of engagement with social movements 
(and originated from one itself), and had decided to support the spread of 
CDBs across the country as a tool of local development. SENAES partnered 
with Banco Palmas, promoting seminars on the solidarity economy, creating 
a link between CBDs and the government, and providing grants for the 
establishment of new CDBs.3 Although recent government transitions mean 
that the Secretariat has been downgraded over time, such that it is now 
nearly non-existent, it had an important early role in creating momentum for 
the implementation of CDBs.
2  Only registered businesses are entitled to exchange Palmas for reais.
3  Interviews with J. Melo Neto and M. Vale by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
Box 1 Main features of a Community Development Bank
1 It is the community itself who decides to create a bank, becoming its 
manager and owner; 
2 A CDB offers two modalities of credit: one in Real and the other in social 
currency; 
3 The lines of credit encourages the creation of a local production and 
consumption network, promoting local development; 
4 CBDs support businesses with their commercialisation strategies (fairs, 
solidarity shops, trading centres and others); 
5 A CDB operates in territories marked by high level of exclusion, 
vulnerability and social inequality; 
6 CDBs focus, above all, on beneficiaries of governmental social aid 
programmes and of compensatory policies; 
7 A CDB’s financial sustainability, in a first moment, is based on subsidies 
justified by its social practices utility. 
Source: BNCB Terms of Reference.
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CDBs in improving local economic conditions throughout the country, the 
participants decided to launch the Brazilian Network of Community Banks 
(BNCB). The purpose of the BNCB was to provide a space for dialogue and the 
exchange of experiences and social technologies, to offer mutual support and 
enable the development of projects, as well as for raising the voice of CDBs 
and lobbying for positive regulations.4 SENAES had the mission of encouraging 
this social innovation by supporting the BNCB’s mission, financing events and 
providing funds for the creation of new CDBs. 
In operational terms, the BNCB endeavours to hold a national meeting 
every two years, but its members sit down together at every opportunity. 
For example, when they travel to other regions of the country for different 
purposes they usually take the opportunity to meet their local peers. Since 
Brazil is divided into five regions – North, Northeast, South, Southeast and 
Centre-West – there is at least one BNCB representative in each region, 
elected every two years on the occasion of the national meeting.5 These 
representatives include universities and NGOs members of the network. 
Joaquim de Melo Neto, founder of Banco Palmas and one of two BNCB 
representatives for the Northeast, explained that there is currently no 
financial resource for the BNCB and its nine current coordinators all work 
on a voluntary basis. Until 2014/15, the BNCB had SENAES’ support, which 
enhanced its voice and recognition in the political-economic arena and 
provided funds to promote meetings and conferences. However, in the face 
of political and economic changes in Brazil, the BNCB has faced difficulties in 
maintaining its activities. Even though the way in which the BNCB operates 
does not require large amounts of money, the lack of funds still affects its 
activities, such as meetings, travel, events and conferences. When the BNCB 
had the government’s support, they met four or five times a year, but now 
the network is much less active, mostly communicating through the internet 
and smartphone apps.6 The long distances between regions in Brazil make 
it difficult to meet face to face. Vale, one of the BNCB representatives for 
the North Region, explained that the priority of the network now is to 
consolidate the CDBs that are already in place, not necessarily to create new 
ones.7 Following the changes in the government, ‘the network has not had 
the time yet to sit down and discuss an articulation strategy to approach the 
new government’.8 Developing this strategy will require both general financial 
support and technical assistance, such as from academia. 
4  Interview with J. Melo Neto by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
5  Interview with J. Melo Neto by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
6  Ibid.
7  Interview with M. Vale by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
8  Ibid.
3 Participation 
Despite its current difficulties, the BNCB has played a key role in encouraging 
participation in economic advancement at a local level, by establishing and 
promoting guidelines for CDBs across the country. Although not formally 
registered as an institution, the BNCB sets out the principles, values and 
operational standards to which CDBs that want to join the network need 
to adhere. This section explores these principles and how they underpin 
participation and influence outcomes in different member banks. To this end, 
three community banks were consulted and results suggest that not only does 
participation matter, but it is, in fact, the main driver of success. 
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The three CDBs visited, namely Banco Palmas (Northeast), Banco Estrutural 
(Centre-West) and Banco Mumbuca (Southeast), were chosen based on their 
origin and current status, as well as taking into consideration the feasibility 
of a visit within the project timeframe. Although they are not intended to 
be representative of CDBs’ approaches, their contrasting situations offer 
important insights into how participation impacts CDBs’ achievements. 
Alongside the cases, additional interviews were conducted with members 
of the BNCB, government authorities and researchers on the solidarity 
economy,9 and their testimonies provide additional insights into the 
relationship between participation and the banks’ results. 
3.1 Levels of community participation 
According to Melo Neto, ‘the very concept of community bank is solidarity, 
financial services of associative and community nature – it is community by 
nature, it must hold the community’s adherence and identity’.10 The BNCB 
thus promotes a number of practices intended to maintain social control 
of CDBs through community ownership and active involvement in decision 
making. The BNCB Terms of Reference (see Annexe 2) establish that CDBs are 
to be managed by community associations or other civil society movements 
originating in the community, such as unions, NGOs or churches. Moreover, 
decision-making forums as well as CDB staff should be composed of local 
residents (Instituto Banco Palmas 2007). 
All the banks in the network follow the principles described in the Terms of 
Reference. Still, CBDs present different levels of community engagement 
based on facts related to their origin, partnerships, financial capacity and 
advocacy efforts. The community adherence mentioned by Melo Neto was 
perceived, during the interviews, to reflect three different levels of community 
engagement, ordered from the most cohesive to the most fragile case as: 
(a) broad community ownership and active involvement in the bank’s decisions 
and activities; (b) recognition of the bank’s local development mission and 
some community involvement in its activities; or simply (c) community 
acceptance of the bank as a local financial services provider and weak 
community involvement. In more detail: 
(a)  Broad community ownership and active involvement in the bank’s 
decisions and activities reflect a strong engagement of a large number of 
residents. In this case, individuals usually assemble to discuss local issues in 
the pursuit of solutions. This suggests a natural sense of ownership over 
9  For the full list of interviewees please refer to Annexe 2.
10  Interview with J. Melo Neto by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
A shop that accepts 
Palmas. 
Photo credit: © Lumo 
Coletivo, CC BY 2.0.
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also suggests that this type of initiative will be more resilient to difficult 
times since residents will potentially sit together once more in the 
event of new challenges. Banco Palmas, a product of ASMOCONP’s 
long trajectory of community mobilisation and having close relations 
with the community is, perhaps, one of the most representative cases. 
Besides being a pioneer, having itself emerged from the community, 
with countless discussions and an active role towards changing its 
social-economic reality (origins), it seems to have maintained community 
ownership through frequent engagement activities such as forums, 
social projects and close relations with residents (advocacy efforts). The 
community built the bank and carries a strong sense of owning it.
(b)  The acceptance of the bank’s local development mission and some 
involvement in its activities usually illustrates recognition of the bank 
as being beneficial for the community but not seen as a product of it. 
There is scepticism from some residents, since they were not part of the 
discussions and construction of the bank, although local social movements 
were involved. The broad community seems to bear not so much a sense 
of ownership over the CDB but rather a collaborative relationship. For 
example, in the case of Banco Mumbuca this relationship originated from 
a public policy, and the bank relies on strong local authority support for 
its establishment and smooth functioning. However, although finance 
does not seem to be an issue, the bank endeavours to prove itself 
as a community movement rather than a government policy. Banco 
Mumbuca’s efforts now seem to be concentrated on building trust within 
the community and encouraging participation, through encouraging as 
many residents as possible to trust the bank, use its services and most 
importantly, to assume control of it through the local forum. Ultimately, 
the intention is for the community to take ownership of the bank. The 
local government itself argues that Banco Mumbuca was created to be a 
community bank and the government has no intentions of controlling it.11
(c)  The acceptance of the bank as a local financial services provider results in 
weak community involvement. The ties between the community and the 
CDB are limited to a number of individuals while the great part is only 
interested in the services the bank can provide. The relationship is shallow 
and there is no strong participation to maintain the bank. These weak 
ties may result from the lack of broad community participation during 
the bank’s establishment and the high turnover of residents, as in the 
case of Banco Estrutural. In fact, sometimes it is even difficult to consider 
these cases as participation processes, but it is important to take into 
account that the CDB was consolidated and managed by a legitimate, 
local movement, even if for some reason this social movement lacks 
the involvement or representation of a great part of the community. In 
the case of Banco Estrutural, it has lacked recognition and engagement 
by the community since its origins, and its financial situation has been 
critical for some time – in fact, its coordinator has been working full-
time on a volunteer basis for the past two years. The bank strives to gain 
residents’ recognition and involvement at any level, acknowledged as the 
fundamental component missing for its success.12 This weakness may be 
explained by its sudden appearance, which means there was no broad 
community participation in its creation (origins). Another disabling aspect 
identified by Ms Teixeira is the high level of resident turnover, which 
makes it difficult to cultivate in the inhabitants a sense of belonging 
and engagement in local movements. Furthermore, the bank’s lack of 
resources undermines advocacy efforts. 
11  Interview with D. Zeidán by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
12  Interview with A. Teixeira by Gabriel Aragao on 22 May 2019.
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The principle of participation as expressed in the BNCB Terms of Reference 
and theoretical-conceptual framework, offers general guidance13 for those 
who want to create a CDB and become part of the network. However, 
since community banks are intended to address local issues, they have the 
freedom to design their own programmes, projects and strategies according 
to their priorities. In fact, they are expected to do so, while also abiding by the 
principles and values set up in the Terms of Reference,14 and which reinforce 
the CDBs’ mission to serve their local communities. 
3.2 Mechanisms of participation 
The BNCB Terms of Reference establish that CDBs are to be managed by 
community associations or other civil society movements originated in the 
community – unions, NGOs, churches – and all the banks in the network 
follow this principle in some way. Moreover, decision-making forums as well 
as CDB staff should be composed of local residents (Instituto Banco Palmas 
2007). Residents should be involved in key decisions to be taken by the bank, 
such as the appointment of the head management team and the definition 
of the social currency to be used. The Executive Board (Conselho Gestor) is 
the main deliberation body in the structure of most CDBs. It is composed of 
social movements, CDB staff and, in some cases, local authorities. A research 
conducted in 2012 with 26 CDBs (74 per cent) in the Northeast Region 
analysed the composition of Executive Boards and registered the presence 
of residents’ associations in 75 per cent of the cases, religious institutions 
in 58.3 per cent, NGOs in 50 per cent, community leaders in 41.7 per cent, 
cooperatives in 41.7 per cent and local authorities in 41.7 per cent of the total 
26 CDBs consulted (Leal, Rigo and Andrade 2016). There is also another 
decision-making space where residents come together to discuss general 
community issues, which include decisions on the community bank. These are 
usually called Local Development Forums and are composed of residents, local 
entrepreneurs and social movements. Its discussions around the bank range 
from the bank’s activities to social projects to community events.15 The same 
forums responsible for making all the bank’s relevant decisions are also the 
places where results are presented, so that participants can make adjustments 
to the bank’s strategies and programmes. 
In terms of daily operations, although credit lines and processes are 
established by the Executive Boards and Forums, decisions on loan requests 
may be taken more directly by the Credit Analysis Committee (CAC). Leal 
et al. (2016) revealed that 73.1 per cent of the CDBs investigated had a CAC 
composed of credit agents, the managing association and representatives 
13  See the BNCB Terms of Reference in Annexe 2.
14  Interview with J. Melo Neto by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
15  Interview with M. Vale 2019 by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
Community
Community
Community
Board
Solidarity Financial 
Services
Mobilisation
Capacity Building
Management Council
Supervisory Board
Local Socioeconomic 
Forum
Figure 1 Typical administrative structure of a Community Development Bank
Source: Authors’ own.
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are analysed separately based on consultations made by credit agents with 
the requester’s neighbours to collect information on his or her profile, such 
as his or her reputation as a good or bad payer. As Mr Alves explains,16 when 
a resident comes looking for credit, the bank also takes other elements 
into consideration, such as his or her attitude towards the community and 
if he or she is a good neighbour. People involved in cases of child labour or 
perpetrating domestic violence will not have the bank’s support. In another 
example, the total amount of a loan requested was denied to a resident 
because he wasted too much water by washing his motorcycle every day, in a 
community of the Northeast Region where droughts in the countryside have 
a long and problematic history.17 CDBs thus also build communal values. 
CDBs’ functioning follows an engagement logic, putting participation into 
practice in terms of enabling broad resident presence in those associations 
in control of the bank and in key decision-making forums. This presence is 
not necessarily direct, but also by representation. For instance, among the 
31,000 residents of the Community of São Benedito, in Vitória (capital of 
Espírito Santo, Southeast Region), an average of 50 to 60 usually show up for 
the meetings, although formal community leaders present at the forums are 
expected to bring the discussions to their respective associations, spreading 
the word all over their neighbourhood.18 In this sense, community leaders are 
key to representing residents’ interests in the forums, rather than expecting 
direct participation by a high number of residents. While community leaders 
may reflect legitimate community interests and aspire to the best for their 
community, it is, of course, difficult to ensure that residents are actually being 
heard through representative structures. Reasons for a potential break in 
communication vary from residents’ lack of interest to engage in discussions to 
leaders’ lack of capacity to communicate effectively. 
Decisions on issues of transparency and accountability also take place at 
the CDBs’ forums.19 Social media and websites are commonly used as 
communication channels between the bank and the community. Besides 
invitations for events and news from the community, these channels may 
provide financial reports. For example, Banco Palmas used to disclose financial 
information on its website, and completed activity reports (finances, courses, 
partners, events) up to April 2013 are still available (Instituto Banco Palmas 
2018). According to the interviews, in one of the CDBs, financial results also 
used to be presented in a public square. However, the financial disclosure in a 
public place also raised the attention of criminals in the money retained in the 
bank. Following a few robberies, the practice was discouraged and numbers 
are now only disclosed internally and during the local forums.20 In addition to 
these methods, it is important to acknowledge that there are informal ways 
in which people get to know the financial conditions of the bank. Since the 
bank is run and fully staffed by residents, information seems to flow freely 
from inside out. Community banks receive a lot of visits every day from people 
who are looking for credit, checking social benefits status, or simply passing 
by. It is common for residents to have relatives or friends working in the bank. 
According to Melo Neto, this all favours transparency, and ‘it would be difficult 
to keep anything in secrecy if they intended to’.21
16  Interview with E. Alves by Gabriel Aragao, 26 April 2019.
17  Interview with D. Landin by Gabriel Aragao, 26 April 2019.
18  Interview with L. Mol by Gabriel Aragao, 10 May 2019.
19  Interview with L. Mol by Gabriel Aragao, 10 May 2019.
20  This happened in Banco Tupinambá (Northern Region), where vigilance and security is a 
collaboration between the community and the local police (interview with M. Vale by Gabriel 
Aragao, 17 April 2019).
21  Interview with J. Melo Neto by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
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3.3.1 Banco Palmas
Section 2 has already provided substantial information on Banco Palmas. 
It is not a traditional limited society and there are no shareholders. The 
decision-making process occurs at the Local Socioeconomic Forum (Fórum 
Socioeconômico Local – FECOL). FECOL conducts weekly meetings where 
consumers, producers, merchants, public institutions (schools and hospitals) 
and representatives of cultural, sportive and religious movements discuss 
Conjunto Palmeiras’ social and economic issues. This ensures the social 
control of the bank (Instituto Palmas 2010). In terms of lending money to 
residents, the process follows the logic of CDBs and decisions are made after 
a consultation with the applicant’s neighbours. The assessment is based on 
the feedback received from the neighbourhood on the borrower’s reputation. 
This is argued to be an ethical responsibility assumed by the community over 
its residents, in this case the clients or borrowers (Instituto Palmas 2010). 
This history and close relationship with the community suggests the first 
level of engagement, ‘ownership’. The community built the bank and carries 
a strong sense of ownership of it. Moreover, the engagement goes beyond 
financial activities and involves other social projects created and embraced by 
the residents (for example, the Elas Project focused on women’s economic 
empowerment through financial training and entrepreneurship). 
This community engagement is important to keep the initiative alive even 
in difficult times: (a) for local economic development to work it is necessary 
that people understand the role of producing and consuming locally, which 
the social currency facilitates; and (b) together community members will 
attempt to find alternative social-economic solutions through the bank. 
In difficult times, collaboration and social cohesion may be of significant 
help. Interestingly, the expansion of Banco Palmas since its foundation and 
the partnerships constructed with external organisations, from NGOs to 
governments to universities to the private sector, did not seem to affect its 
image before the community. On the contrary, these external engagements 
reinforced community pride in Banco Palmas’ image. With the financial 
capability and external recognition brought by these partnerships, the bank 
could provide more services to the community.
3.3.2 Banco Estrutural
Unfortunately, as shown in the case of Banco Estrutural, a lack of engagement 
is compromising its survival, even more than the absence of financial resources. 
Estrutural is a poor neighbourhood in the suburb of Brasília-DF, the capital 
of Brazil. It is recognised as an Administrative Region22 and has a population 
of 45,000. Estrutural’s history only started in the 1960s when the first 
settlers built their huts around an enormous dumping ground to live from 
whatever they found in the garbage – for personal use or (from the 1990s) 
to sell as recycling materials (Jornal da Estrutural 2010). The settlement grew 
considerably over the decades and when it received city status some attention 
from the local government was given. The infrastructures and sanitation that 
were delivered by the local authority was not enough as the considerable level 
of poverty persists today. In this context, many social initiatives emerged from 
both inside and outside the community to tackle local issues.
In 2012, a local NGO called Education and Culture Movement of Estrutural 
(MECE) founded Banco Estrutural. The way in which Banco Estrutural was 
created differs substantially from how Banco Palmas came into existence. 
Although Banco Estrutural was implemented by the local organisation, 
MECE, and abides to the BNCB Terms of Reference, the trigger for the 
22  This is what the cities around Brasilia, in the Federal District, are referred to.
 PAGE 12
ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION CASE STUDY  No. 4  February 2020 www.ids.ac.uk 
EC
ON
OM
IC
 PA
RT
IC
IPA
TIO
N 
ST
UD
Y bank’s establishment came from an outside source instead of a broad 
community mobilisation and discussion around local problems. In 2011, 
MECE was contacted by Ateliê de Ideias, an organisation responsible for a 
CDB in Vitória (Espírito Santo state), also a member of the BNCB. Ateliê de 
Ideias had recently won a call for proposals and offered to support MECE in 
implementing a CDB in Estrutural. MECE accepted the offer instantaneously 
since the organisation had been looking for an opportunity to develop a similar 
initiative for a while. The plan was discussed with other local movements 
that would become members of the Executive Board. A consultation with 
984 residents showed support to the initiative.23 Banco Estrutural then started 
to operate with the support of other local NGOs. 
Although rooted in a genuine movement intended to enhance social-
economic conditions in the community, the history of the bank suggests a 
lack of broader community engagement since the beginning. The problems 
reported by Ms Teixeira, the bank’s coordinator, include a high level of payment 
default – reaching 40 per cent at one point; lack of financial resources to 
operate – the bank is broke and has no credit to offer at the moment; and 
lack of community participation – even community leaders stopped attending 
the forums.24 Moreover, Ateliê de Ideias had funded the two credit agents 
working at the bank and when the financial support came to an end the bank 
was not able to keep its staff. Whoever is left is acting on a voluntary basis, 
including the bank’s coordinator. 
Banco Estrutural strives to maintain its activities, but there has been a lack 
of community engagement from the outset, as acknowledged above. The 
participation here, in terms active involvement, appears not to represent 
the overall number of residents, and thus relates the bank to the third level 
of engagement, ‘acceptance’. There is acceptance of the bank only as a 
local financial services provider, resulting in weak community involvement. 
According to Ms Teixeira, there are two crucial components that partially 
explain their situation. One is that when the community was to formally 
become an Administrative Region of the Federal District, the government 
distributed small plots in the area for people to build their houses, attracting 
new settlers from all over the country. This sudden movement of people 
meant that the social ties normally constructed through coexistence have 
not materialised. The other component is the paternalistic policies in place 
during that time created in the residents a sense of entitlement over anything 
offered to the community, undermining the sense of individual responsibility 
and collective action towards their neighbourhood. As a result, people do not 
feel responsible to clear their debts with the CDB. 
3.3.3 Banco Mumbuca 
Banco Mumbuca was founded in 2014 in the Municipality of Maricá, State of 
Rio de Janeiro. However, its origins are related to a local public policy. In 2013, 
the city had a population of 139,000 inhabitants, with 10 per cent considered 
to be living in poverty. In face of that situation, the local government decided 
to provide poor families with a financial social benefit derived from the royalties 
of oil exploitation in the region (Raposo and Faria 2015). The Mayor knew 
about the experience of Banco Palmas and social currencies and he invited civil 
society to establish a community bank, offering his support and commitment 
of paying all the social benefits through the CDB, in the social currency. Banco 
Mumbuca, although emerging from a governmental proposal, was a project to 
be carried out by the community, which controls all aspects of its functioning.25 
This social control allowed Banco Mumbuca to be part of the BNCB. 
23  Interview with A. Teixeira by Gabriel Aragao on 22 May 2019.
24  Ibid.
25  Interviews with N. Sciammarella (17 May 2019); and D. Zeidán and J. Melo Neto (17 April 2019) 
by Gabriel Aragao.
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Unlike Banco Estrutural, Banco Mumbuca relies on significant support from 
the local government, which allows it to prosper – at least financially. The 
government provides the physical structure where the bank operates, uses the 
bank’s services to transfer social benefits and even pays the salaries of some 
staff. However, this close relationship with the public authority may cause 
some scepticism on the part of the community. For example, some restaurants 
and commercial establishments next to the bank that were visited during the 
research demonstrated approval and engagement in the social currency, which 
apparently benefited their businesses; however, one taxi driver expressed 
distrust in the initiative, saying it was just another public policy intended to 
gain votes in the next election. Although these examples cannot be considered 
as representative of broad community opinion, the mixed views expressed 
would be understandable under such circumstances.
The city of Maricá has its own Secretariat of Solidarity Economy. According 
to its Secretary, Mr Diego Zeidán, the policy was developed to empower 
the community and there is no intention from the government to maintain 
the bank under its control.26 The initiative is to persist regardless of which 
government is in power or whether future governments support it. But as 
the case of Banco Estrutural demonstrates, it may have missed a fundamental 
component of prior social mobilisation and broad community engagement in 
discussions around the theme. The current government’s support is certainly 
crucial for its operations and is envied by most of the banks in the network. If it 
was not for this support there are doubts whether Banco Mumbuca would have 
survived, or even been created in the first place. In addition, the involvement 
of the public authority and public money brings a component of transparency 
and accountability, which may be advantageous for the community in general; 
for instance, financial reports up to 2018 are available on the bank’s website. 
Banco Mumbuca has also been able to achieve a considerable degree of 
resident participation in some of its activities, mostly events, possibly due to its 
capacity in providing zero-interest loans and to the volume of social benefits 
paid through the bank. This links the bank to the second level of engagement, 
‘involvement’, usually demonstrated by the acceptance of the bank as 
beneficial for the community though it is difficult to be seen as a product of it. 
The bank’s efforts now seem to be concentrated on marketing and convincing 
as many residents as possible to trust the bank, use its services and, most 
importantly, to assume control of it through the local forum. 
26  Interview with D. Zeidán by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
Table 1 Level of community engagement in Banco Palmas, Mumbuca and Estrutural
CDB Origin Level of 
engagement
Source of funds* Current status
Banco Palmas Community 
mobilisation
Community 
ownership
Donations, outsourced 
projects and partnerships, 
loan repayment, 
e-dinheiro revenue
Fully operating and 
developing new solutions 
(e-dinheiro)
Banco Mumbuca Social policy Community 
involvement
Public funds and social 
benefits operations, 
e-dinheiro revenue
Expanding activities and 
engaging residents
Banco Estrutural External NGO Community 
acceptance
Donations and loan 
repayment
No funds available; 
striving to maintain 
activities
* Includes not only the funds to maintain the bank but also the resources provided by other institutions through the 
CDB, e.g. microcredit offered by Banco Popular do Brasil. 
Source: Author’s own.
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Overall, these results suggest that not only does participation matter, but it is, 
in fact, the main driver of success. Although participation may be reflected in a 
variety of forms, the three CBDs studied demonstrate that engagement is not 
only crucial for the bank’s existence but the depth of it is also a determinant of 
the bank’s success or failure. Social control is thus the fundamental component 
to be preserved in any CDB, regardless of it origin – even if it had been 
motivated by a public policy, a university or any other agent.27 In the future, 
the challenges faced by CBDs will include maintaining this social control as 
external conditions change and as the banks themselves grow and evolve (for 
example, see Box 2 for a discussion of the development of e-dinheiro). 
27  Interview with J. Melo Neto by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
Box 2 E-dinheiro: a platform for community banks
In mid-2015, Instituto Palmas launched e-dinheiro, in partnership with 
MoneyClip, a small Brazilian start-up working with digital platforms for financial 
inclusion. Owned by Instituto Banco Palmas and initially piloted in Conjunto 
Palmeiras, this platform enables community banks to deliver solidarity financial 
services via text message, mobile apps, and the internet. By 2018, 81 community 
banks had registered with the platform, of which 48 have so far used it for local 
operations and 21 have been actively implementing it in their communities. The 
paper form of the community currency is now being used as an educational 
tool, supporting financial education and used in solidarity economy workshops. 
Although still in its infancy and with variable uptake across the network, 
e-dinheiro is already making a difference for community banks like Banco 
Palmas and Banco Mumbuca. Following solidarity economy principles, 
e-dinheiro charges lower fees than similar services elsewhere, with any 
surpluses made by the community banks reinvested locally. The platform also 
makes essential financial services such as opening an account, paying bills, and 
money transfers readily available to those that have traditionally been excluded 
from Brazil’s financial system. In some community banks additional services 
are also provided through partnerships with municipal governments. In the 
case of Banco Mumbuca, for example, a municipal cash transfer programme, 
‘Bolsa Mumbuca’, is disbursed via the e-dinheiro platform. In Fortaleza, the 
city government has partnered with Banco Palmas to pay informal waste 
collectors (catadores) via their e-dinheiro account for the recyclable material 
they collect. 
E-dinheiro can also be contrasted with other, more typical forms of Fintech, 
because of its links with community banks. Generally, with Fintech the 
upgrade, development, and roll out activities are highly centralised, while in 
contrast, e-dinheiro offers space to develop features and services based on 
the participation of beneficiaries, meaning that they are better aligned with 
local needs. Furthermore, the community banks and communities decide 
together how fees and resources accumulated through the use of e-dinheiro 
will be invested back into their territories. Overall, the goal of e-dinheiro is 
to be a reliable service that leverages technology to increase the impact of 
community banks in delivering solidarity finance services, while also generating 
sufficient income to sustain its own activities and to finance initiatives within 
the community. 
Source: Ansorena et al. (forthcoming). 
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Development Banks
28  Afro-Brazilian communities first settled by escaped slaves during slavery period. Interview with 
M. Vale by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
29  Interview with M. Vale by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
30  Family income up to R$275 per month (around US$118 in December 2008).
As of 2019, the BNCB has 113 CDB members, located all over Brazil, from the 
Amazon forest in the North, to the very South. The network is spread through 
90 cities, in 20 out of Brazil’s 27 states (Banco Palmas 2018). ‘They are where 
no one wants to go – poor remote areas, riverside villages, quilombolas’,28 
in fishing villages and excluded poor urban or rural areas in general. The first 
impact of CDBs is thus to create local financial inclusion in places that seem 
to be forgotten by the authorities and where commercial banks are rare. As in 
one example cited in the interviews, ‘instead of traveling 73km to the capital 
[Belém, Pará state] to buy a piece of cheese, residents can now buy it locally’, 
due to the increased number of local shops made possible by the CDB.29 
At the same time, CDBs encourage entrepreneurship and cooperation, and 
create jobs. Research conducted in 2010 in the context of Banco Palmas 
shows that 1,800 families benefited from its credit lines (Instituto Palmas 
2010). In the previous year, the number of local purchases increased from 
the 20 per cent registered in 1997 to 93 per cent of the total community 
spending. When asked about reasons for using the social currency (the 
Palma), residents confirmed that credit was their major interest (43 per cent), 
but they acknowledged the importance of discounts offered by local shops 
(22 per cent), salaries received in Palmas (18 per cent) and support to the 
local economy (10 per cent). In ten years of Banco Palmas’ operations, there 
was a considerable improvement in the local income. The poorest30 residents 
benefited the most, with the incidence of poverty falling from 20 per cent 
in 1997 to 4 per cent in 2008 (França Filho et al. 2012: 510–11). Table 2 shows 
the most common responses from when residents were consulted about the 
impact of Banco Palmas in their lives.
The impact of a CBD on a community will depend in part on the financial 
condition of the bank itself, although this is not always easily ascertained 
from publicly available information, as discussed above. Updated financial 
information on Banco Palmas and Banco Estrutural was not available to the 
researchers. However, the difficult financial position of Banco Estrutural 
obviously limits its potential to achieve at least some of the outcomes listed 
above for Banco Palmas. In the case of Banco Mumbuca, updated numbers 
Table 2 Residents’ perspective on how Banco Palmas has improved their lives
Most common answers
Increased my income 25.2% 
Got to know other people 23.2% 
Found work 20.2% 
Brought new projects to the neighbourhood 12.1% 
I became better known in the community 11.1% 
Increased my interest in studying 5.0% 
Helped the neighbourhood grow 1.0% 
Source: França Filho et al. (2012: 511).
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involvement of public funds in its activities which means that transparency is 
mandatory.
As a project built by the community, CBDs’ existence depends on residents’ 
mobilisation, community recognition and collective control. According to 
Raposo and Faria (2015), beyond financial inclusion and economic benefits, this 
process of engagement also supports community members’ voice and agency 
in other social, economic and political spheres, enabled by a greater sense of 
autonomy, freedom of choice and self-confidence. Banco Palmas, which itself 
emerged from strong community engagement, runs a portfolio of cultural, 
social and economic projects (e.g. cooperatives) from its premises.
Although the emergence of Banco Palmas was based on strong pre-existing 
community ties, it does not necessarily follow that this social cohesion cannot 
be built. As Vale explains, even the social currency itself can function as a 
collaborative tool.31 When the currency is embraced by the community as a 
product of its own, the local market moves towards collaboration and mutual 
gains rather than the usual dominant, competitive paradigm. For example, 
small businesses begin to buy from each other locally and make joint purchases 
when they have to shop externally.
31  Interview with M. Vale by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
5 Conclusions 
Over the last two decades, many microcredit initiatives arose in Brazil. Public 
and private banks attempted to include the poor as a target audience for some 
of their services. This is broadly related to the popularisation of microcredit 
by relevant international institutions, such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), among others 
(França Filho et al. 2012). The Grameen Bank’s experience in Bangladesh in the 
1970s, under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, pioneered and inspired this 
approach internationally. Nonetheless, in Brazil these microfinance services 
were only unlocked after the monetary stabilisation in the late 1990s that 
finally overcame a long period of systematic inflation (ibid.). Despite the initial 
excitement, however, none of the large microfinance institutions achieved 
the level of participation that Banco Palmas did. The bank’s social ties and 
the way in which it was conceived inside the community established crucial 
elements of its success. Interestingly, it was originated from dialogues among 
community leaders who had only basic education and had never heard about 
Muhammad Yunus (Instituto Palmas 2010). 
The participation experience of Banco Palmas was seen by the new 
government in 2003 as a promising means to enhance local development, 
and one that could be replicated across the country. The national government 
(through SENAES), local governments, universities and commercial banks 
– both public and private – demonstrated interest in becoming involved and 
supporting the spread of the model. In fact, they all proved to be important 
actors and played a role in the development of the BNCB by providing funds, 
technical expertise, adjusting policies or simply recognising the movement 
and strengthening its voice. In this context, the BNCB emerged as a point 
of articulation and a national reference for community banks. Its principles 
and guidance provide a recipe for the establishment of new CDBs based 
on community participation, and its Terms of Reference is a significant tool 
to achieve that. Nevertheless, despite the BNCB’s intentions to preserve 
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community ownership over the banks, the analysis of the three cases in this 
study points to important features (potential challenges and constraints) that 
need attention as they affect the development of a CDB. 
First, the origins of a CDB mark significantly its relationship with the 
community. When it emerges from a broad, participative local movement, 
it carries the fundamental engagement necessary for its development and 
survival. This is the case of Banco Palmas. When it is motivated by other actors 
(e.g. government or external NGO), as was the experience of Banco Estrutural 
and Banco Mumbuca, it is important to consider: how the community is 
already mobilised in the pursuit of solutions for local issues; the level of 
activity, representation and recognition of the local organisation assuming 
the development of the bank; and strategies for broad participation and 
engagement. 
Second, in order to achieve high levels of community engagement and 
an ‘ownership’ level of engagement, a CBD needs to focus persistently 
on communicating its essence, role and goals to the largest number of 
residents possible. Gaps in this communication strategy during the process of 
establishing a CDB, as well as in consolidating the social currency, impact on 
trust between bank and community (Leal et al. 2016). In fact, there are barriers 
to overcome even when the CDB follows Banco Palmas’ example, emerging 
from a broad (local) engagement movement. According to Vale, for example, 
the introduction of a new currency can initially be viewed with considerable 
distrust, so a strong communication effort is necessary to convince consumers 
and entrepreneurs of its potential benefits for the whole community.32 
Third, engagement in the CDB’s mission must come from a broader support 
base in the community, beyond the activists. In some cases, activists represent 
genuine local movements trying to improve local conditions, but it is 
nevertheless important to engage the broad community in discussions and 
actions towards jointly defined development goals. This is so because without 
residents’ support, initiatives lose strength, lack participation, face resistance 
and become unsustainable. 
Finally, for all the cases, regardless of the level of engagement (ownership, 
involvement or acceptance), it is essential to have a financial sustainability 
strategy, crucial for maintaining the bank’s operations. After all, a CDB cannot 
provide microcredit and other financial services, or be a place for cultural and 
political expression, if it cannot survive. There are internal questions within 
32  Interview with M. Vale by Gabriel Aragao, 17 April 2019.
Community cooperative 
Palma Limpe. 
Photo credit: © Lumo 
Coletivo, CC BY 2.0.
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current national, financial and legal framework. It was not until a new law was 
passed in 2013 (Lei 12865 Arranjos de Pagamento) that CDBs could create 
their own bank accounts and issue electronic currency, provided they built their 
own digital platform (e-dinheiro). Due to this law, CDBs are now able to offer 
an array of services that previously only retail banks could provide. However, it 
seems that there are a number of other areas that still lack financial regulation 
from the national authorities; those which could enlarge CBDs’ portfolio of 
services and benefit their sustainability. Future research needs to explore how 
this legal framework impacts CDBs’ financial sustainability. 
This case study is based on the testimony of those involved in the BNCB, as 
well as on documents, reports and data provided by them. It has identified 
participation and community engagement as key factors in the success of 
CDBs. The BNCB is playing an essential role in the development of a common 
identity for CDBs based on local collective ownership and solidarity. Future 
research could explore other important elements such as governance at 
the BNCB level, and communication at the CDB level, as well as different 
methods of financial accountability and transparency in place and their impact 
on participation. 
There are other new initiatives being developed that also deserve future 
research. CDBs such as Banco Palmas have tried to innovate in the way 
some of their projects engage the community; for example, Block Councils 
(Conselhos do Quarteirão) and community Wi-Fi (PalmasNet). Banco 
Mumbuca has developed an interesting and informal process of redesigning 
services, tools and overall experience of e-dinheiro by the local users/residents, 
as well as periodic checks on how to locally invest the fees collected through 
the use of e-dinheiro (0 per cent interest loans). It will be interesting to see 
how these technologies, especially e-dinheiro, impact the way CDBs deal with 
community participation, ownership and sustainability. There are important 
arguments for both positive and negative influences of technology on 
participation, and future studies may assess the development and potential of 
those technologies.
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Name Function Interview date 
BNCB
Joaquim de Melo Neto Banco Palmas (Founder and Director) 17 April 2019
Marivaldo Vale Banco Tupinambá (Coordinator) 17 April 2019
Leonora Mol Banco Bem (Founder and Director) 10 May 2019
Banco Palmas
Nayara Sousa Microcredit Coordinator 25 April 2019
Otaciana Barros Manager of e-dinheiro 25 April 2019
Katiana Oliveira Member of Project Elas 25 April 2019
Banco Mumbuca
Natália Sciammarella Director 17 May 2019
Suely Rodrigues Development Agent 17 May 2019
Diego Zeidán Secretary of Solidarity Economy in the Municipality of 
Maricá
17 May 2019
Banco Estrutural
Abadia Teixeira Coordinator 22 May 2019
Deuzeni Candido General Support (External Relations and Projects) 22 May 2019
Banco Paju
Eudasio Alves Founder and Director 26 April 2019
Eduardo Ribeiro Financial Coordinator 26 April 2019
Daniela Dias Landin Project Coordinator 26 April 2019
SENAES
Roberto Marinho Former Deputy Secretary 11 July 2019
Researchers
Eduardo Diniz Professor and Researcher on Microcredit of Fundação 
Getulio Varvas (FGV)
15 April 2019
Camille Meyer Researcher of Microfinance 16 April 2019
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Banks Terms of Reference
Community Development Banks – Terms of Reference
What is a community bank?
They are networked solidarity financial services, of an associative and 
community nature, focused on the generation of work and income through 
the reorganisation of local economies based on the principles of the Solidarity 
Economy.
Main features
1 It is the community itself that decides to create the bank, becoming the 
manager and owner;
2 Community banks offer two types of credit: one in Real and one in the 
local social currency;
3 Its credit lines stimulate the creation of a local production and 
consumption network, promoting the endogenous development of the 
territory;
4 They support enterprises in their marketing strategy (fairs, solidarity stores, 
trading centre and others);
5 They act in territories characterised by a high degree of exclusion, 
vulnerability and social inequality;
6 They are mainly aimed at beneficiaries of government assistance 
programmes and compensatory policies; and
7 Their short-term sustainability is based on obtaining subsidies, which are 
justified by the social utility of their practices.
Goal
To promote the development of low-income territories by fostering the 
creation of local production and consumption networks, based on support 
for solidarity economy initiatives in various fields, such as: social enterprises 
providing services and goods (grocery stores, shops and solidarity fairs), and 
producer and consumer organisations.
Management structure
Community Development Banks are managed within structures of 
community-based organisations (such as associations, forums, councils) or 
other types of civil society initiatives within the community (unions, NGOs, 
churches). Its operation thus presupposes the constitution of an executive 
coordination team within the associative organisation itself. Its management 
thus implies a shared dimension, with a strong component of local social 
control based on mechanisms of direct democracy.
Sustainability
Sustainability is achieved by raising public funds and establishing a solidarity 
community investment fund. This fund consists of multiple sources of finance, 
including donations from individuals and companies, membership fees 
(individuals and/or companies), non-competitive merchant services, and other 
types of services.
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1 Locally circulating social currency;
2 Solidarity credit through delegated concessions with financial agents and/
or through a solidarity fund (such as Banco Popular do Brasil CEF, Caixa 
Econômica, BNDES, etc.);
3 Credit for financing solidarity enterprises;
4 Interest free credit for personal and family consumption;
5 Solidarity credit card;
6 Opening and current account statement;
7 Current account deposit;
8 Withdrawals;
9 Bill payment for securities;
10 Bill payment for utilities (water, electricity, telephone, etc.);
11 Payment of benefits; and
12 Mortgages.
Target audience
Community Development Banks focus primarily on those with a high degree 
of social vulnerability. However, due to its status as a citizen initiative focused 
on territorial development, these experiences should also involve other groups 
in certain market segments, such as young people, women, traders, new 
entrepreneurs, etc.
Activity area
Community Development Banks primarily operate in territories with up to 
50,000 inhabitants, in order to enable the methodology to work properly. 
There may be more than one community bank operating in the same territory.
* These Terms of Reference were approved at the II Meeting of the Brazilian 
Network of Community Banks, held on 18, 19 and 20 April 2007, at SESC 
Iparana, Caucaia – Ceará. 
Source: www.institutobancopalmas.org/termo-de-referencia-dos-bunos-
communitarios-de-development / (accessed 7 August 2019).
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